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Abstract
After establishing an ethical religion of his own,
Kant explores the functions of different aspects
of traditional or “historical” religions. Since the
moral religion takes priority over any other
historical religion, dogmatic beliefs and
practices could possibly undermine Kant’s true
ethical aim of religion. Prayer and other similar
rituals, not a part of “true religion”, represent
mankind’s feebleness in seeking out moral
conceptions. Although Kant claims prayer can
serve as a useful element in his greater theology,
I argue that his analysis offers little to pure
religion and only accounts for the prevalence of
prayer historically. The psychological
phenomenon Kant deems a weakness in man
requires some worldly manifestation in order to
actualize moral duty. Ritualistic practices fulfill
this requirement yet also have the ability to
mislead one away from their true moral
obligations. One must tread lightly when
performing such rituals and not lose focus on
moral growth. So, all of the traditional practices
of religion such as scriptural interpretation and
intercessory prayer must only act as a means
toward the actualization of moral imperatives. I
conduct an analysis of these means to conclude
that they are unnecessary in Kant’s pure, selfevident, religion. Further, I critique Stephen R.
Palmquist’s argument for the apparent
usefulness of prayer as a way of becoming
worthy of God’s goodness.
The foundation of Kant’s second
Critique, practical reason, gave him the
necessary tools to construct a moral religion.
As the religion was further developed
throughout his work, Kant was able to establish,
as practically necessary, an immutable divine
being. The aseity of the divine judge in

conjunction with the certainty and autonomy of
the moral law made all ritualistic practices that
claimed to serve God seem futile. For most,
prayer is a way of pleading to God and/or
evading responsibilities. Under Kant’s
depiction of an immutable God, it is easy to see
why prayer would seem not to have a function
at all. Indeed, Kant is hypercritical of prayer
used in the popular notion and even goes so far
as to condemn it as a detrimental practice
opposing “true religion”. However, prayer is
not completely dismissed from Kant’s theology.
He develops a philosophy of prayer which
makes use of ritualistic practices within the
constraints of his “true religion”. Although
Kant’s views on the usefulness of prayer offer
no greater understanding of his religious
framework, they are sound within the bounds of
that framework nonetheless. I intend to argue
this by first expositing the way in which Kant
incorporates prayer into his theology and then
illuminating the apparent reasons behind
prayer’s usefulness. Stephen R. Palmquist gives
an argument in favor of the role of prayer in
Kant’s philosophy to which I will offer a
critique.
To understand prayers’ place in Kant’s
theology, we must first briefly examine his
religion in transcendental terms. Just as in
Kant’s epistemology, religion is seen through a
“transcendental perspective.” As subjects, we
actively interpret passive objects of the world.
This alone, Kant believes, provides us with
justification behind our perceptions. In
theological terms, “pure rational religion” stems
from our actively determining passive objects of
religion. These objects are presented to us as
categorical imperatives. From this formulation
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It is clear that the empirical element which all
humans need to grasp the concept of morality is
not specified. This is because all empirical
elements are themselves not universal and
therefore are arbitrary. According to this
classification, prayer is then a useful mechanism
which fulfills this need.
Since the empirical element satisfies our
natural need to seek out the concept of morality
in the world there must exist a particular
relationship between the two. Kant claims that
not just any experience can fulfill this need.
One must use “great reserve and caution” when
attempting to draw the correct moral principle
out of an experience. Otherwise, one could
misconstrue God’s end or aim. When analyzing
prayer as an experience in this light, Kant
creates a dichotomy between formal prayer
(letter) and the spirit of prayer:

arise the necessary conditions for the possibility
of an empirical religion but also, as Kant points
out, the possibility for an opposition to that
religion. Kant expresses that it is the “pure
religion” alone that holds priority with the
empirical (historical) religion subservient to it.
There exists a “grey area” where each religion
overlaps; historical religion incorporates
doctrines of pure religion (Palmquist, 586).
There is an area, however, where historical
religion does not incorporate or promote pure
religion yet is still held as a religious doctrine
by followers. Thus, in transcendental terms, the
empirical element diverts attention away from
pure religion i.e., away from morality.
Hence prayer, an element of historical
religion, potentially poses a problem to pure
religion. Furthermore, prayer, as stated above,
seems impossible, given that it aims to
manipulate an unchangeable God. Kant gives a
simple proof to show that “God acts in no way
but freely. Nothing has any influence on him, so
as to be able to move him to act in any
particular way and not otherwise” (Kant, 426).
This way, traditional prayer would seem to have
no place in Kant’s philosophy.
Pure religion takes priority over
empirical religion, because it is presented to us
as certain where other “services of God” are not:
“It is self-evident that the moral service of God
pleases him directly” (Kant: “Religion Within
the Boundaries of Mere Reason”, 196). We
have no sound basis to assert that other rituals or
practices would do the same since they are not
presented to us as an imperative. However, this
does not mean that historical religion is
completely useless. Kant claims that historical
religion can actually act in service of the true
religion but only because of human frailty:

Praying, conceived as an inner ritual
service to God and hence as a means of
grace, is a superstitious delusion (a
fetish-making); for it only is the
declaring of a wish to a being who has
no need of any declaration regarding the
inner disposition of the wisher, through
which nothing is therefore accomplished
nor is any of the duties incumbent on us
as commands of God discharged; hence
God is not really served. A sincere wish
to please God in all our doings and
nondoings, i.e. the disposition,
accompanying all our actions, to pursue
these as though they occurred in the
service of God, is the spirit of prayer,
and this can and ought to be in us
“without ceasing” (Kant: “Religion
Within the Boundaries of Mere Reason”,
210).

…because of the natural need of all
human beings to demand for even the
highest concepts and grounds of reason
something that the senses can hold on to,
some confirmation from experience or
the like, some historical ecclesiastical
faith or other, usually already at hand,
must be used (Kant: “Religion Within
the Boundaries of Mere Reason”, 142).

The first sentence is a clear condemnation of
prayer. But notice that Kant draws the
distinction between the two types of prayer by
calling to mind their purpose. Prayer treated as
though it, in itself, were pleasing to God
accomplishes nothing. However, prayer as a
means to enhance our disposition toward God
ought to be instilled in us. So, Kant is not
simply condemning all prayer, but only the false
136
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The same applies to prayer. If one interprets
prayer in terms of the moral imperative to arrive
at the spirit of prayer which urges that I obey
divine command, it’s already understood that
one recognizes his or her duty to obey. Now, it
could be noted here that the moral imperative is
translated into divine command through
interpretation of prayer. Here, prayer is serving
to reassure one of God’s presence. However, I
believe that since the interpretation of divine
command was derived from my preconceived
notion of morality, the interpretation offers no
fruitful understanding of pure religion which I
did not already know. At best, interpreting
religious text only in terms of ethical duty or, as
Kant calls, forced interpretation, changes the
aesthetic of the moral law that we may hold in
our heads. However, as Kant makes very clear,
we must be very cautious not to deface the
imperative too much such that God’s end
becomes skewed. With this in mind, it would
seem one would rather tread lightly by not
shifting his understanding of the moral law at
all.
Kant’s treatment of our natural need to
manifest higher concepts empirically could
make prayer or other rituals seem necessary, as
if they were a formal requirement in actualizing
ethical duty. Palmquist interprets Kant in this
way:

interpretation of prayer by treating it as an ends
in itself. Prayer in the service of the moral
imperative is actually something that we should
all adopt. The spirit of prayer, however, is not
understood in the traditional sense of prayer
(e.g. reciting “The Our Father” or other prayers)
since, according to Kant, this would be a false
interpretation. Instead it is an internal
disposition to want to please God through duty
(action). Thus prayer is only bad when it
infringes on one’s moral growth. Everything
must be interpreted as being inferior to the
moral element. So, because of our natural need
to seek an empirical element in the pure
religion, the spirit of prayer becomes a useful
element in helping us reach God’s end.
Despite prayers’ usefulness, Kant makes
clear that prayer and other forms of ritual are
often harmful to pure religion. Historical faiths
work against the true aim of God, because they
claim to be the object of His end (Kant, 142).
As evidence, these faiths provide revelation and
scripture for which they offer their own
interpretation. Obviously this is false, Kant
claims, because these revelations and scripture
are not presented as certain and universal as the
categorical imperatives are. Thus the faiths are
doing a disservice to humans by misrepresenting
God’s aim.
In Kant’s view, the only way of
incorporating revelation and scripture into the
service of God is to interpret them such that
they act as means towards the fulfillment of
moral duty just as in the spirit of prayer.
Revelation and scripture, then, would need to be
reinterpreted since they clearly don’t all agree
with Kant’s view on religion. Kant
acknowledges that “this interpretation may often
appear to us as forced” (Kant, 142). It is often
forced because one must take a piece of work or
experience and be sure to only extract moral
principles from it where there may seem to be
no moral principles in it at all. Interpreting a
piece of scripture or a revelation is usually for
the purpose of reaching a greater understanding
of what is at hand. If what is being interpreted
is already known, what is the point in
interpreting it? It certainly won’t enrich my
understanding since I am imposing my
understanding on it. Nothing can be extracted.

Before God’s assistance can do any
good, ‘man must first make himself
worthy to receive it’ – and this
worthiness refers not to ‘doing good
deeds’ (a view often wrongly imputed to
Kant) but
to fostering a receptivity
for goodness in one’s disposition. A
person who prays to become worthy of
God’s goodness is (or ought to be)
conforming to this principle (Palmquist,
595).
I think this is a misreading of Kant. Palmquist
is suggesting that prayer suffices to satisfy the
requirement that we must first be worthy of
God’s power before we are able fulfill his
commands. Kant, though, does not think of our
natural need as a necessity in the bounds of pure
religion. Instead, he is only accounting for
137
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historical faith having a consistent presence in
all human history. So the natural need should
be treated more as a psychological phenomenon
than a necessity. Kant acknowledges that there
are those who choose to concern themselves
with higher concepts (such as philosophers) and
do not need prayer as a means to manifest the
imperative. Although prayer may satisfy some
individuals' needs to experience the moral
“ought”, Palmquist is mistaken in thinking that
this need extends to all as a prerequisite to being
worthy of God's power.
Although Kant endorses the usefulness
of prayer in his theology where it might seem
inconsistent, he never asserts it in a truly
positive sense: prayer alone is not pleasing to
God. With this in mind, the two uses of prayer
that Kant adumbrates, reassurance of God and
an "extra" incentive towards fulfilling moral
duties, are both valid and sound within his
theology. However, Kant's formal construction
of true religion certainly doesn't seem to need
prayer. The forced interpretation that Kant calls
for is problematic in that it may fulfill a need in
the individual but it also brings that individual
closer to misconstruing the moral law.
Furthermore, the moral interpretation
presupposes that the individual already knows
the imperative well. Limiting oneself to only
one type of interpretation of scripture seems
fruitless. I think Kant preferred that all persons
should try to resist this need, if they felt it, and
simply adhere to the moral law that they
discovered a priori. Perhaps he was simply
trying to appease some authority breathing
down his neck. It is also possible that Kant was
bothered by the fact that history is so saturated
by these religious doctrines. He may have felt
compelled to account for it some way in his
philosophy so he deemed it a frailty of mankind.
But it would seem that after reading Kant's
theology and recognizing that our need to
manifest God's aim was a fault, we would
change our ways and pull away from any natural
need. Regardless, I think Kant acknowledges
that ritualistic practices are an overall detriment
to his moral religion but only chose to include
them insofar as they have been such a common
instrument throughout the course of history in
all cultures.
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